To empirically test the impact of CEOs' outside wealth on their compensation, I use spousal divorce as a proxy for a negative shock to a CEO's outside wealth. I predict that this shock decreases a CEOs' risk tolerance and that the board of directors adjusts the CEOs' compensation incentives in response to the change in incentives. I find that cash bonuses, restricted stock grants, and option grants increase following CEO divorce, suggesting boards react to changes in CEOs' outside wealth and risk incentives. I also find lower equity risk, idiosyncratic risk, and cash flow risk during the year of a CEO's divorce, consistent with lower risk tolerance. I find no support for alternative explanations of the observed compensation increases: 1) There is no evidence that CEOs delay compensation to the years following divorce. 2) CEOs do not reduce risk from being "distracted" by the divorce. 3) Higher compensation following divorce is not driven by selection bias. In addition, the results are not driven by firm governance, CEO effort, or other variables related to probability of divorce. Overall, the results on compensation support a risk-based interpretation of higher compensation following CEO divorce.
Introduction
CEOs hold substantial wealth in their firms. In 2008, CEO equity holdings of Execucomp firms accounted for $33.5 million in dollar ownership or two percent of firm value on average. Due to the high value of CEO ownership, existing literature predicts CEOs' personal portfolios are undiversified, because CEOs' firm holdings are too large relative to their outside wealth. Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) propose the lack of diversification reduces the value of risky compensation to risk averse CEOs. Hall and Murphy (2002) find lower wealth also weakens the dollar incentives of equitybased compensation and, as a result, increases the cost of CEO compensation to the firm.
The implications of CEOs' diversification on compensation are not empirically testable, because CEOs' outside wealth, wealth unrelated to firm value, is not publicly available.
2 Without reliable data on CEOs' outside wealth, previous literature estimates outside wealth from various proxies. Dittmann and Maug (2007) calibrate optimal executive contracts and proxy for CEO wealth with past income. Hall and Murphy (2002) assume outside wealth comprises thirty-three to fifty percent of total CEO wealth. Yet, they concede "our inability to observe non-firm-related wealth is an important limitation of our analysis".
To capture variation in CEOs' outside wealth, I propose using divorce as a negative shock to a CEO's wealth. Divorce is likely unexpected by the board, because marital issues are more likely to be determined by personal, familial considerations than firm attributes, and divorce has a negative impact on wealth from the loss of substantial assets in divorce settlements. 3 For example, Lorna Wendt 2 While the SEC requires disclosure of a CEO's firm-related holdings (stock, restricted stock, and option holdings), there are no disclosure requirements for a CEO's outside wealth (cash, personal investments, and real property). 3 Although domestic data is limited, international data supports the assumption of a large wealth loss from divorce. Sheehan, Chrzanowski, and Dewar (2008) report in survey results that wives in "high-income" divorces in Australia receive over 60 percent of basic (house, car, etc.) assets and over 20 percent of non-basic (stock options, luxuries) assets. In England, Norwich Union's "Cost of Divorce" survey estimates the average cost of divorce to be £28,000 (2006) or 126 percent of £22,202 (2005) , the average annual income.
(Source: http://www.worldsalaries.org/uk.shtml http://www.aviva.co.uk/media-centre/story/2935/brits-spend-over-4-billion-on-divorce/ .) Some American practitioners estimate average legal costs of divorce at $20-25,000. (Feigenbaum and Linton, 2004 , The Complete Guide to Protecting Your Financial Security When Getting a Divorce.) received a judgment of $20 million of Gary Wendt's, former CEO of GE Capital, estimated $100 million of assets. 4 I use 79 CEO divorces to examine how negative shocks to CEOs' outside wealth impact their risk preference and compensation. I hypothesize that negative shocks to their outside wealth decrease the CEOs' risk tolerance, consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) or constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
5 I expect a CEO's reduced portfolio diversification decreases her subjective valuation of equity-based compensation and decreases the dollar incentives provided by the compensation. The effect of the shock to outside wealth and optimal compensation policy is ambiguous because the compensation provides fewer incentives, but the cost to the shareholders of providing incentives increases. That is, the board may award a larger amount of equity-based compensation to provide the same level of incentives to the CEO. Alternatively, the board may award less equity-based compensation, because the cost of awarding compensation would be higher per dollar of incentive provided. The change in compensation policy following a shock to outside wealth remains an empirical question.
I find increases in CEOs' salary, bonus, restricted stock, and option grants in the year after a divorce, relative to the year before divorce. In univariate analysis, salaries and bonuses increase significantly by $147,000 (24%) and $359,000 (46%) at the mean, respectively. The mean value of stock grants and option grants (Black-Scholes value) increases by about $636,000 (174%) and $1,633,000 (61%) following divorce. The increases in compensation are also significantly larger than increases in compensation for a matched sample of firms. I match a control group of firms based on industry, year, and asset size, and I find compensation for divorced CEOs is significantly higher than peers following a 4 The settlement included the value of options (although not the options themselves), which he was awarded during his tenure at GE. The $20 million likely accounts for an even larger portion of his former wealth given that $100 million was the estimation Lorna Wendt and her counsel produced for the court. Lawyers' fees were not included in the settlement figure. 5 See, e.g. Murphy (2000, 2002) , Jenter (2002) , and Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) , among others.
CEO divorce by $407,000 for cash bonus, $307,000 for restricted stock grants, and $2,393,000 for option compensation.
6 I look at CEO compensation sensitivities to stock price after a divorce. Following previous literature, I define Delta (Vega) as the dollar change in the value of annual grants of options per one percent (.01) change in firm value (volatility). Consistent with the rise in the value of option compensation following CEO divorce, I find compensation Delta and Vega are higher following divorce.
The greater sensitivity suggests that boards provide higher compensation incentives to CEOs as the CEOs lower the subjective value they put on their compensation.
I also document lower firm risk in the year of a CEO's divorce. The temporarily lower risk is consistent with CEOs decreasing their personal portfolio risk following a loss of wealth. CEOs face constraints on selling their stock and option holdings (see, e.g., Kahl, Liu, and Longstaff, 2003) . In spite of selling constraints, Tufano (1996) finds managers can use corporate hedging policy to reduce their firm risk exposure. I find idiosyncratic volatility, total equity volatility, and cash flow volatility are lower in the year of CEO divorce. The lower volatility is consistent with undiversified CEOs reducing firm risk to reduce their portfolio risk, suggesting that CEO diversification can have a significant impact on corporate policy.
Total CEO compensation increases by about $2.8 million following a CEO divorce. Lower firm risk around divorce suggests that CEOs become more risk-averse around the loss of wealth in a divorce settlement. Higher compensation sensitivities following divorce show the board of directors aligning CEOs' compensation incentives following divorce. The higher costs of compensation during a CEO's divorce are born by the shareholders. That is, CEO divorce creates an agency cost to the shareholders in the form of higher compensation and, potentially, lost investment opportunities. The divorce creates a 6 Results are robust to matching based on different firm attributes or propensity score matches.
residual loss (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , because the CEOs' marital decisions will not always reflect the interests of their shareholders, yet cannot be avoided.
I check the robustness of the analysis of CEO divorce on compensation and verify the use of divorce as a proxy for a change in CEOs' wealth. I examine CEOs' holdings around divorce and confirm CEO divorce proxies for a change in outside, not firm-related, wealth. CEOs' holdings of stock, restricted stock, and options do not significantly decrease between the year before the divorce and the year after the divorce. In fact, the number of unexercisable and exercisable options held by the CEOs increases between these years. I compare the sample of divorced CEOs to a matched sample of firms. I find that divorced CEOs do not hold significantly less restricted stock or fewer options than the matched sample following a divorce. These results suggest that any decrease in a CEO's wealth following a divorce consists of a decrease to the CEO's outside wealth, not their holdings in the firm.
I confirm the relation between divorce and compensation is not endogenously determined by using selection models. I regress an indicator for CEO divorce on determinants of divorce and the determinants of compensation in a first stage probit model. I control for age, gender, tenure, children, and time trends (see, e.g., Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007a) in addition to determinants of compensation.
I then use the inverse mills ratio from the first stage to control for the choice of divorce in compensation regressions. The indicators for CEO divorce remain statistically significant in all compensation regressions. I obtain similar results using propensity scores to control for the choice of CEO divorce.
I also examine alternative explanations of my results. First, CEOs may anticipate a divorce, and defer compensation until after a divorce in an attempt to hide assets from their spouse. I check that
CEOs do not defer compensation in expectation of a divorce. In all models, I include an indicator for the year before a divorce. If CEOs deferred compensation in expectation of a divorce, I would expect lower compensation before divorce. I find no evidence of lower compensation in the year before a CEO's divorce, suggesting that CEOs do not accept lower payments before a divorce to hide compensation until after their divorce settlements are finalized. Alternatively, CEOs may be unable to benefit from hiding assets. Some jurisdictions in the U.S. hold that future CEO compensation can be awarded to the ex-spouse.
There is also little evidence that CEOs are "distracted" during divorce, which could reduce firm risk and induce greater compensation incentives. In unreported analysis, I examine CEOs' effort around divorce. I proxy for CEOs' effort using accounting performance, industry adjusted ROA or past performance adjusted ROA. Accounting performance does not significantly decline during a divorce, suggesting they are not distracted during the divorce.
I also check that higher compensation around divorce does not result from a change in the composition of the sample. CEOs may leave office following a divorce. If I remove the CEOs who leave office following a divorce from the sample, the results on compensation do not change. I also find no relation between the higher compensation and governance. I segment the divorced CEOs into groups based on compensation committee independence or, separately, CEO ownership. Divorced CEOs receive higher compensation following divorce irrespective of the independence of the compensation committee or CEO ownership. Increases in compensation following divorce do not seem to be driven by rent extraction related to poor governance.
I contribute to the executive compensation literature in three ways. Primarily, I examine a change to CEOs' wealth and provide empirical evidence on the impact of outside wealth on executive compensation. I present evidence of changes in CEO wealth incentives that impact compensation policy, consistent with Hall and Murphy (2002) , Verrecchia (1991), and Dittmann and Maug (2007) , among others. I find that compensation incentives can impact corporate policy (see, e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006) and risk-taking (see, e.g., Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn, 2012) by examining changes in cash flow and equity risk as outside wealth changes. I provide evidence that firms increase incentives following a loss of CEOs' outside wealth, consistent with Core and Guay (1999) who find that compensation incentives increase when portfolio incentives are low. Finally, I contribute evidence that CEOs' personality traits (see, e.g., Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2010) and personal financial decisions (Liu and Yermack, 2007) can impact corporate financial policies by showing that marital relations can impact CEOs' incentives and decisions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature and develops related hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents results on compensation and CEO divorce. Section 5 further explores the evidence on changes in CEO incentives and firm risk. Section 6 examines alternative explanations, and section 7 concludes.
Previous literature and hypotheses
Principal-agent theory models managers as risk averse agents of their shareholders (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1983; Holmstrom, 1979) . These models generally predict a decreasing relation between managerial risk aversion or firm risk and incentive compensation (see, e.g., Garen, 1994,) .
When the models incorporate constant relative risk aversion into managerial utility, managerial risk aversion becomes a function of wealth.
7
However, the empirical evidence on principal-agent models has been mixed. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) find a negative relation between return variance and the strength of CEO incentives.
The authors interpret their results as evidence consistent with principal-agent models. Core and Guay (2002) contest the evidence on the relation between risk and incentives and find a positive sign on the relation, consistent with previous work by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) .
These inconsistent findings may result from the inability of principal-agent models to appropriately model observable compensation packages. Dittmann and Maug (2007) find that calibrations of the principal-agent model over a wide range of parameter estimates fail to consistently predict observed contracts. For example, the use of options is rarely predicted using the standard 7 CRRA and DARA preferences have been used by Hall and Murphy (2002) , Jenter (2002) , Lambert and Larcker (2004) , and Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) . principal-agent model. They also predict that higher wealth does not lead to similar predictions across salary, stock, and options. Salary should decrease with wealth, and stock grants should be more common than option grants.
Due to the complexity in calibrating optimal contracts in a principal-agent model, several papers have examined the impact of CEO risk aversion and outside wealth on the value of the compensation in isolation. 8 This literature relates the value of equity compensation to CEO risk aversion. They show that undiversified CEOs discount the value of restricted stock and option grants below market values due to the higher risk held by the undiversified CEO. For example, Hall and Murphy (2002) find a negative relation between the subjective value of equity-based compensation and CEO wealth.
Core and Guay (1999) and Guay (1999) provide evidence that boards use stock and option grants to manage performance and risk sensitivities when portfolio sensitivities deviate from optimal levels. That is, the board awards more compensation incentives as portfolio incentives decrease and vice versa. If lower outside wealth decreases CEOs' subjective performance sensitivity of compensation and firms react to lower performance sensitivities by raising compensation sensitivities, then boards should increase equity-based compensation following a decrease in CEO wealth.
A CEO's subjective value of incentive compensation may decrease with outside wealth, but the cost to the firm of providing the same level of incentives may increase if more grants are awarded to provide the same incentives. Hall and Murphy (2002) show that the percent of CEO wealth invested in the firm can have a dramatic effect on the potential cost of compensation. For example, a CEO with a higher percentage of her wealth invested in the firm (67%) would require stock compensation worth twice the value of an equivalent cash payment to maintain the same utility. The increased cost of equity compensation to the firm may outweigh the greater need to provide CEO incentives. Becker (2006) finds higher wealth is associated with greater compensation incentives, consistent with a lower cost of providing incentives to less risk averse CEOs. If costs change with CEOs' outside wealth, lower outside wealth would be associated with less equity-based incentives.
The lack of consistent predictions related to CEO risk aversion and the power of CEO incentives leaves little intuition as to the relation between CEO wealth and compensation. Baker and Hall (2004) even assume that the impact of CEO wealth on compensation is too small to impact the CEO's marginal utility of income, controlling for the CEO's percent of firm ownership and dollar stakes.
Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010) diverge from standard risk-based explanations of CEO compensation to overcome some of the limitations of principal-agent and risk-based models. They find that models incorporating managerial loss aversion provide superior calibrations of optimal contracts.
Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010) model agents utility with respect to a reference wage. The reference wage is subject to a discounting factor that may be a function of the CEO's diversification and, hence, outside wealth. 9 In optimal contract calibrations, Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010) show greater discounting of wages is generally related to higher levels of salary and options. A loss in CEO outside wealth would increase the amount of option and salary compensation given to the CEO.
Decreasing risk aversion in wealth has been modelled since Pratt (1964) , but a lack of data availability has limited the empirical evidence on the relation between wealth and risk aversion, especially with respect to executive compensation policies. Many empirical papers provide inconsistent findings on the relation between wealth and compensation. Becker (2006) finds a positive relation between CEO wealth and the strength of CEO incentives using a sample of Swedish CEOs, consistent with traditional principal-agent theory (see, e.g., Holstrom and Milgrom, 1991) . Other papers predict 9 Proving the impact of outside wealth on the compensation discount parameter in a loss-aversion model is beyond the scope of this paper. I simply follow Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010) and note that compensation is generally discounted relative to a diversified investor.
greater incentives when portfolio incentives are reduced, as new grants compensate for reduced incentives (see, e.g., Core and Guay, 1999 To collect data on CEO divorce, I exclude CEOs who were only present for one firm-year to ensure more than one observation for all CEOs in the panel. This exclusion leaves 4,385 individual CEOs.
Execucomp provides the names, ages, and principal office locations of the 4,385 CEOs. I gather information on CEO divorce using LexisNexis' and Westlaw's public records databases, LexisNexis Academic Universe's news/press release databases, and biographical sources on the internet (e.g., web pages of CEO's personal foundations). The Data Appendix provides a more complete description of the data and collection of CEO divorce information.
There are two potential concerns with the data collection. First, media sources provide several observations on CEOs' divorces. Media coverage may vary by industry or firm characteristics. Second, public records of divorce filings are not available in all jurisdictions. Because some industries cluster geographically, certain industries may not be found in jurisdictions that limit coverage of divorce filings. comparison, I report magnitudes of book asset size, market-to-book ratio, and other control variables 10 The percent of first marriages ending in divorce is a concave function of years since wedding, indicating a lower probability of divorce for longer marriages than the general population. In addition, Stevenson and Wolfers (2007b) report the percent of marriages ending in divorce is also increasing in year of marriage, implying that older generations are less likely to get divorced. CEOs in sample tend to be older (median age 53) with longer marriages (median marriage year 1976). Conditional estimates of divorce probabilities given age and year of marriage may be as low as one-third of the national average. Marriages during the 1950s and 1960s experience the lower portion of marriages ending in divorce, by year/decade of marriage. Factors such as education, gender, and age at time of marriage also impact divorce probabilities.
Description of data
for the sample of divorced CEOs and a matched sample of firms in Panel B of Table 2 . I match firms from
Execucomp to the sample of firms with a CEO divorce based off of sharing the same Fama-French 48 industry, year, and asset size. The average Execucomp firm is relatively similar to the firms with divorced CEOs and the matched sample in firm size and compensation package. In unreported robustness analysis, I confirm the univariate results are robust to various matching procedures. In addition to matching on size, industry, and year, I adjust matching to require that the matched sample has similar market-to-book ratios. I also use propensity score matches to form matched sample. I form propensity scores using the predicted probability of CEO divorce to match. Previous literature documents an increase in CEO compensation over time (see, e.g., Murphy, 1999) . Compensation increases around divorce could result from a time trend, not a change to CEO wealth. I use the matched sample of firms to control for changes in compensation related to time, industry, or firm attributes. Panel B of Table 2 reports t-statistics and sign-rank Z-statistics of differences between the compensation of the divorced CEOs and the matched sample of CEOs. I employ nonparametric sign-rank tests because the assumptions of t-tests may not hold in smaller samples.
In the year before divorce, the compensation packages seem relatively similar across the two groups. There are no statistically significant differences between the compensation of CEOs who divorce and the matched sample in either t-tests or sign-rank tests. In the year after divorce, bonus, restricted stock grants, and option grants are significantly higher for CEOs who divorce, revealing an increasing trend for divorced CEOs relative to the control group of CEOs. These initial results are consistent with boards increasing incentives following a loss of outside wealth. Cash compensation increases the CEO's outside wealth, increasing portfolio diversification. Similarly, the greater stock and option compensation directly increase performance sensitivities for the CEOs. The larger equity incentives are consistent with boards adjusting portfolio incentives through compensation incentives (see, e.g., Core and Guay, 1999) .
CEO holdings around divorce
I check that divorce proxies for a loss to CEOs' outside wealth by examining changes in CEO stock and option holdings around divorce. Almost all mean and median statistics of ownership variables increase over time, giving no initial indication that the CEO loses a portion of her firm-related wealth in the divorce. To confirm this trend, I
use paired t-tests and sign-rank tests to compare the holdings of each divorced CEO before and after divorce to the matched sample. The number of shares owned shows no significant decreases relative to the matched sample in the years around divorce. CEOs' holdings of stock and options tend to increase around divorce, suggesting that new grants are given to the executive around divorce. Ex-spouses do not take a significant portion of the CEOs' holdings during a divorce, and I expect the majority of CEO wealth lost in divorce comes from the CEOs' personal, outside wealth.
Magnitude of the loss of wealth
The amount of wealth lost in a divorce is only publicly available in rare cases when a party files suit or the media obtains estimates of the settlement. However, anecdotes, trends in divorce judgments, and survey evidence suggest the magnitude of the wealth lost in divorce ranges from 25% to 50%. While not every court takes a community property view that each spouse receives half of the marital assets, courts generally rule that the non-working spouse's standard of living should be maintained. Additionally, legal fees can be significant, often exceeding one million dollars in high wealth divorces.
Anecdotal and survey evidence also suggests that CEOs are not able to limit losses in divorce through prenuptial agreements. Even before divorce, CEOs are unlikely to protect their wealth through prenuptial agreements. Only three percent of wealthy individuals have prenuptial agreements. 12 Also, prenuptial agreements often get thrown out in high profile divorces from improper contracting. For example Steven Spielberg's contract was written on a bar napkin and thrown out, and Ivana Trump got 12 A Business Week survey polled people who make more than $100,000, http://www.businessweek.com/1998/31/b3589005.htm far more than her prenuptial agreement specified. Prenuptial agreements often protect the less wealthy spouse or a subject to unique provisions. Michael Douglas must pay Catherine Zeta-Jones several million per year of marriage and $40 million for cheating. Prenuptial agreements may also be subject to sunset provisions, which void the contract after a stated number of years. Jack Welch's prenuptial agreement expired after 10 years. Overall, I do not expect prenuptial agreements reduce divorce settlements to insignificant portions of a CEO's wealth.
Results on compensation regressions

CEO divorces and the level of compensation
I further test for differences in compensation using the matched sample and the full panel of I take control variables from the executive compensation literature as compiled by Core and Guay (1999) . Controls include size, proxied by log of sales, and growth opportunities, proxied by market-to-book ratio. Past returns can impact compensation (see, e.g., Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang, 1996) . I use returns and lagged returns to control for past performance. Finally, cash constraints or taxes can make options and stock relatively more valuable. I follow papers such as Yermack (1995) and Matsunaga (1995) and control for cash constraints, tax carry-forwards, and dividend constraints. Table 3 presents the regressions of salary, bonus, restricted stock grants, and option grants on indicators for CEO divorce. The panel includes only the time series for firms at which a CEO divorced and the matched sample, previously described.
13 I take all observations for the sample firms and the matched sample, not only the years around a divorce. I run multivariate regressions with the limited set of firms to directly compare the divorce-affected firms to a similar set of firms in a smaller sample. The smaller sample comparison reduces the potential to pick up idiosyncratic differences between Execucomp firms and the sample of divorce-affected firms that are unrelated to CEO wealth changes.
The regression coefficients on CEO divorce in Panel A of Table 3 are generally consistent with the univariate results. The first two regressions find salary and bonus are significantly higher in the years following a CEO divorce. The coefficient estimates suggest that CEOs' salaries are higher by $67,000 and bonuses are higher by $224,000 on average in the year after a CEO divorce. Cash directly contributes to CEOs' outside wealth. The higher levels of cash compensation are consistent with the board of directors providing the CEO with more outside wealth to diversify her portfolio. CEOs performance incentives are increasing in their portfolio diversification. If the expected profit from the relative increase in performance incentives to the CEO is more than the cost of awarding cash compensation, then the board will be willing to pay higher cash compensation to an undiversified CEO.
The indicator for the year of divorce shows higher levels of bonus compensation, even though raises in compensation are not expected until after the news of divorce. However, the dates of divorce are based on divorce filings, not announcement dates, which are not obtainable. Because the filing date 13 Multivariate results are also robust to using matched firms based on propensity score matching.
should be interpreted as the last possible announcement date, it is possible that news of the divorce and actions to change compensation precede the observed filing date. It is not surprising to see compensation increases in the year of divorce, given the wealth shock to the CEO may happen before the actual date of filing for divorce.
I run multivariate regressions of the levels of a CEO's restricted stock grants and option grants around divorce, presented in Panel A of Table 3 . Option grants are about one million dollars higher at the mean in the year after divorce, using the Black-Scholes value of the options. Restricted stock grants are about $422,000 higher in the year after divorce. After a wealth loss, a risk averse CEO discounts risky compensation more than before the wealth loss. That is, after a CEO divorce the board may need to award compensation with a higher market value to provide the same subjective level of compensation to the CEO.
Panel B of Table 3 CEOs deferring compensation in an attempt to prevent assets from being included in a divorce settlement.
Overall, the results on compensation suggest the board may use cash compensation to increase CEOs' diversification. The board also still views stock and options as valuable compensation, even though CEOs' subjective valuation of stock and options has decreased after divorce. Guay, 2002) . Similarly, Vega is defined as the dollar change in the value of option for a .01 change in equity volatility. I focus on pay for performance (Delta) and equity volatility (Vega) sensitivities, because a shock to CEOs' outside wealth is likely to reduce the subjective value of incentives and increase risk aversion. Similar to Table 3 , I regress the sensitivity of compensation on indicators for the years around CEO divorce and control variables.
The sensitivity of CEO compensation around divorce
I find compensation sensitivities, Delta and Vega, are higher in the years following a CEO's divorce. Delta increases by almost $25,000 and Vega increases by about $21,500 in the year after a CEO's divorce. Similar results hold for regressions using the log of compensation sensitivity to reduce the impact of any non-linearity. 14 Core and Guay (1999) present evidence that firms award incentive compensation (stock and option grants) to adjust the sensitivity of the executive's portfolio toward an optimal level. Hall and Murphy (2002) predict CEOs' subjective compensation incentives decrease with a decrease in their wealth because CEOs' discount compensation to a greater extent with less total wealth. Higher Deltas after a CEO's divorce are consistent with boards awarding greater compensation incentives following a decrease in the CEO's subjective valuation of her incentives. Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) propose that CEOs' risk tolerance declines with their outside wealth. Following a loss of outside wealth, boards may award compensation with higher Vega to counteract a decrease in CEO risk tolerance. The higher level of Vega following a CEO divorce is consistent with boards mitigating changes in CEOs' risk aversion.
Changes in risk incentives
Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) predict CEOs with lower outside wealth are more risk averse. After a loss of wealth, CEOs are also more exposed to idiosyncratic risk because they are less diversified. I expect CEOs' lower risk preference impacts stock price volatility because undiversified
CEOs have incentives to reduce firm equity risk (see, e.g., Tufano, 1996) . I test for changes in executive incentives by looking at annual firm risk around divorce.
I use the standard deviation of log returns to proxy for total firm risk. I construct idiosyncratic risk as the annual sum of squared errors from a four-factor Carhart (1997) model with returns taken at monthly intervals to avoid microstructure noise. The model includes the market variable, Rm-Rf, the concentrated in the year of divorce, suggesting that a lack of attention around divorce does not drive the lower observed risk. Rather, the lower risk in the year of divorce is consistent with predictions that a lack of portfolio diversification decreases CEOs' risk tolerance. As divorced CEOs become less diversified, they have greater incentives to reduce firm risk. The indicator for the year following a CEO divorce is insignificant in risk regressions, possibly due to the greater compensation incentives awarded after a divorce.
I further examine the change in firm risk around CEO divorce by examining corporate policy. May (1995) finds that CEOs undertake diversifying acquisitions to diversify their personal portfolios.
Similarly, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) find that CEOs' compensation incentives can impact investment policy. Around divorce, I do not expect major changes in corporate investments (e.g. acquisitions). However, CEOs may change corporate policy or engage in hedging activity to reduce the volatility of the firm (see, e.g., Tufano, 1996) . In Panel B of Table 5 
Alternative Explanations
I examine CEO divorce and find compensation increases following divorce. The higher compensation is consistent with the board increasing compensation incentives in response to a decrease in aCEO's risk tolerance following a loss of outside wealth. However, there are alternative explanations that can explain the relation between CEO divorce and compensation. In this section, I
explore alternative explanations and address issues related to endogeneity, governance, and other potential interpretations of the results.
Potential endogeneity between CEO compensation and divorce
If divorce is not exogenous, then the compensation increases could be associated with a variable that impacts the probability of divorce. For example, if a CEO works marginally harder, all else equal, then the time and energy devoted to work may increase performance and compensation, while negatively impacting the CEO's marriage. I control for a possible endogenous relationship between divorce and higher levels of compensation by examining CEOs' effort. CEOs' can spend less time with family to work extra hours at their firms. In unreported analyses, I proxy for CEO effort with industry-adjusted ROA and ROA demeaned by the previous three years' ROA. I expect greater effort increases performance. With the effort proxies, I control for the possibility that CEOs who work more or invest more personal time in their work are more likely to get divorced. The initial results on CEO compensation remain substantially unchanged when I include proxies for abnormal ROA in the compensation regressions. This suggests that CEO effort investment in the firm is not likely driving the observed relation between divorce and compensation.
I also address concerns of endogeneity using the estimated probability of divorce. I estimate divorce probabilities in a probit regression with previously established determinants of divorce (see, e.g., Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007a) . Independent variables related to divorce include CEO age, gender, number of children, and time effects. I include CEO tenure to control for the possibility that CEO status contributes to the probability of divorce. Results are also robust to controlling for geographic and legal differences by including state of residence fixed effects, proxied by the location of the firm headquarters.
16 Table 6 controls for selection issues related to modeling CEO divorce. CEOs may choose to divorce depending on firm or personal characteristics. For example, poor performance may increase anxiety, which can create strain on the CEO's marriage. Similarly, the CEO's status at the firm may impact the choice of divorce. If a CEO is closer to retirement, then the shorter career horizon may incentivize a greater preference for family over work.
I use a Heckman two-stage regression to control for the CEO's decision to divorce. To estimate the first stage, I use CEO tenure, the number of children, an indicator for gender, and an indicator for CEO retirement age (an indicator for CEO firm-year with age greater than or equal to 63) to proxy for any variables that may relate to the choice of CEO divorce. 17 I also include the controls from the regressions of compensation, including year and industry fixed effects.
I include the inverse mills ratio from the first-stage probit model in the second-stage compensation regressions. The inverse mills ratio does not show a significant relation to CEO compensation in all regressions, suggesting that variables relating to the CEO's decision to divorce do not impact compensation beyond the divorce itself. However, the indicator for the year following a CEO divorce remains significant in all compensation regressions. That is, the relation between CEO divorce and compensation appears to be driven by the loss of CEO wealth, not covariates that influence a CEO's decision to divorce.
CEO divorce and rent extraction
The relation between CEO divorce and compensation is consistent with the board optimally reacting to a change in CEO risk tolerance following a wealth shock. However, the observed relation between compensation and divorce may be related to rent extraction. To mitigate the impact of divorce on total wealth, it is possible a CEO uses her influence over the board to replace some of the wealth lost in divorce. To examine this issue, I verify whether increases in CEO compensation following a divorce are increasing in the level of influence the CEO has over her compensation.
To measure a CEO's potential influence over her compensation, I use compensation committee independence to proxy for the CEO's influence over the board, following Yermack (1996) . I split the divorced CEOs into two groups based on compensation committee independence. Roughly half of the sample of divorced CEOs have boards where the majority of the compensation committee is independent. I compare the sample of divorced CEOs to a matched sample of CEOs. In unreported univariate analysis, I find compensation is higher for divorced CEOs than the sample group, irrespective 17 Including the number of past marriages or industry-adjusted ROA as controls does not significantly impact the results. Under some specifications, the inverse mills ratio has a statistically significant coefficient, but the indicator for CEO divorce still shows a statistically significant relation to compensation in all regressions.
of compensation committee independence. In fact, salary compensation for divorced CEOs is not significantly higher than the matched sample when the compensation committee is not independent.
Additionally, I partition the sample of divorce-affected CEOs into above-and below-median ownership. I expect CEOs with lower ownership will have higher agency conflicts due to their lower relative interest in the firm. Contrary to an entrenchment hypothesis, compensation is higher, relative to peers, following divorce for CEOs with higher ownership. The results hold if value or percent ownership proxy for ownership.
Conclusion
Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) predict that a CEO's outside wealth impacts the value of the CEO's compensation because outside wealth may not diversify all of the CEO's portfolio risk. Hall and Murphy (2002) show that the discount an undiversified executive places on risky compensation also applies to compensation incentives. The predictions of changes in compensation incentives are difficult to test empirically, because there is little data available on the wealth of CEOs.
I use CEOs' divorces for a sample of Execucomp CEOs to proxy for a significant loss of outside wealth. I show bonus, restricted stock grants, and option grants increase after a CEO divorce controlling for time, industry, and firm attributes. Core and Guay (1999) show that boards award new compensation contracts to adjust the portfolio incentives of the CEO. I find compensation increases following a divorce, consistent with a change in CEO compensation incentives following a loss of wealth that decreases portfolio diversification. The increase in compensation suggests that the board of directors considers the entirety of a CEO's wealth, not just the wealth that is sensitive to changes in firm value.
Additionally, I look for evidence of reduced CEO risk toleracne following a loss of wealth by examining the firm risk around divorce. I measure firm risk using total equity risk, idiosyncratic risk, and cash flow risk. Risk regressions show significantly lower volatility in the year of divorce. This lower risk suggests that CEOs change their corporate policies around a loss of wealth. This evidence is consistent with Tufano(1996) , who shows that CEOs may reduce the volatility of their personal portfolios through indirect hedging when they cannot sell or hedge their ownership directly. Altogether, changes in firm risk support the prediction that CEO risk aversion increases following a shock to outside wealth, and this impacts the firms through compensation, investment, and risk.
I check the robustness of the relation between CEO divorce and compensation to alternative explanations, including an endogenous relation between divorce and compensation policy. I estimate the probability of divorce and find little evidence that divorce is related to firm characteristics that could drive the relation between divorce and compensation. I also find no evidence that higher compensation following divorce results from deferring compensation or rent extraction around divorce.
Overall, results on compensation suggest that CEOs receive higher levels of compensation related to a loss of outside wealth. Because the board sets compensation, this result also suggests that the board considers a CEO's outside wealth when setting compensation to align incentives. The cost of the compensation increases comes at the expense of the shareholders, who would not have had to otherwise award the abnormally higher compensation. The results provide novel evidence on the importance of CEOs' outside wealth and the implications of outside wealth on corporate policy.
Variable Appendix Variable Definition
Age The age of the CEO.
2nd Year After CEO Divorce An indicator equal to one in the second year following a CEO divorce.
Annual Return
The annual stock return of a firm.
Assets (Millions)
The book value of firm assets.
Cash Constraints
The three year average of [(common and preferred dividends plus cash flow in investing minus cash flow from operations)/assets]. Cash Flow to Asset Volatility
The three year running volatility of firm cash flows divided by the book value of assets. At least two years of data is required.
Dividend Constraints An indicator equal to one if [(retained earnings plus cash dividends and repurchases)/prior year's cash dividends and repurchases] is less than two in any of the previous three years, or if the denominator is zero for all three years.
Dividend Payer An annual indicator equal to one if the firm pays dividends.
Divorce Propensity (Firm) A propensity score created from a probit regression of an indicator for divorce on firm attributes including CEO tenure, an indicator for retirement age (over 63), industry-adjusted ROA, abnormal ROA and two-digit SIC code indicators.
Divorce Propensity (Personal) A propensity score created from a probit regression of an indicator for divorce on firm attributes including CEO age, number of children, gender, number of previous marriages, generation (decade of birth), a post-2000 time indicator, and location (state of principal office).
Divorce Year An indicator equal to one in the year of CEO divorce.
Idiosyncratic Volatility
The annual sum of squared errors from a four-factor Carhart (1997) model of returns. Monthly data is used to calculate the idiosyncratic volatility measure.
Male Indicator An indicator equal to one if the CEO is a male, zero otherwise.
Market-to-Book
The ratio of the market value of the firm (shares outstanding times price) divided by the book value of assets.
Number of Children
The number of children a CEO has.
Number of Marriages
The total number of previous marriages for a CEO.
Options Grant Value (Thou.) The Black-Scholes value of annual option grants.
Option Grant Sensitivity
The value of the change in total value of the option grant for a one percent change in stock price.
Pre-2000 Indicator
An indicator equal to one if the year is before the year 2000, zero otherwise.
Retirement Age
An indicator equal to one if a CEO is age 63 or over.
Return on Assets (ROA) Annual firm income (EBIT) divided by assets.
Return Volatility
The standard deviation of (log) returns, calculated annually from monthly data.
Stock Grant Value (Thou.) The value of annual grants of restricted stock calculated as the number of grants times the stock price of the firm.
Rest. Stock Grant Sens. (Value)
The change in the value of the restricted stock grant for a one-percent change in the value of stock price (directly proportional to number of grants).
Sales (Millions)
Annual firm sales in dollars.
Salary/Bonus (Thou.) The annual salary/bonus of the CEO.
Shares Owned (Thou.)
The number/value of shares owned by the CEO, excluding options.
Restricted Stock (Thou.)
The amount/value of restricted stock held by the CEO that is not vested.
Unexercisable Options (Thou.) The number/value of unexercisable options held by the CEO.
Tax Carry-forwards Tax Carry-Forwards is an indicator equal to one if there were carry-forwards in any of the three previous years.
Tenure
The number of years that a CEO has held office up to the current year, as provided by Execucomp.
Time Trend A counter variable that increases by one for every year past 1990.
Exercisable options (Thou.) The number/value of unexercised exercisable options held by the CEO.
Year After CEO Divorce An indicator equal to one in the year following a CEO divorce.
YearBefore CEO Divorce An indicator equal to one in the year before a CEO divorce.
CEO Divorce Data Appendix
I gather data on CEO divorces from several sources. I begin with legal filings and give preference to this data, because of the greater reliability, compared with media sources. Divorce filings are considered public information in most of the states in the U.S.. I primarily use Lexis-Nexis and WestLaw's public records databases, which include divorce filing databases. These sources contain divorce filing information that includes the names of the parties involved, the date of the filing, the location of the filing, the age of the parties, the date of the marriage (filing date), and, typically, the number of children from the marriage. Local governments retain the actual divorce filings (making direct searches in county or municipal courthouses prohibitively costly New York by using media and other publicly available data sources to obtain data.
In addition to public records databases, I gather data on CEO divorces from governmental sources. Texas produces a comprehensive list of divorces for the entire state that is accumulated at the state level from the local courts. This list is downloadable from the state of Texas' official website.
Similar to the public records databases, the Texas data contain the names of parties involved, the location of the filing, the date of the filing, the ages of the parties, the date of the marriage, the number of children, and Texas-specific identifier numbers. In addition to the Texas data, direct contact with courts was used through websites and telephone contact where specific courts could be identified.
However, use of information through direct contact to courts was limited due to the difficulty of identifying the specific court where a divorce was filed and due to the costs required by courts to obtain information.
I also collect data on CEO divorce from the Thompson Insider Trading database. Until August 1996, stock transactions by insiders related to qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs) had to be reported to the SEC, transaction code Q. QDROs were typically the result of divorces. Although encompassing only a short window of the study and providing few observations of divorce, this dataset allows verification of a divorce when stock is sold related to the divorce. This dataset provides the executive names, the company names, and the date of the divorce-related transaction. With this data, divorce dates were cross-checked with other data to ensure the date of the transaction corresponded with the date of the divorce.
In addition, publications, press releases, and news articles are used to gather information on CEO divorces. Primarily, Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe searches on each CEO provided information from U.S. news sources and major publications relating to the CEO for the past 20 years (since 1988).
These articles provide not only information pertaining to the date of a CEO's divorce, but, often, anecdotes about the details of the divorce. I also search the New York Times Weddings/Celebrations section. Independent searches of this section were done outside the Lexis-Nexis Academic universe because of the familial information provided by this section. In general, New York VIPs and socialites report marriages in this section. Marriages of CEOs are covered, as well as marriages of their children, which provides current information on the CEOs' spouses. This coverage provides information on the mother and father of the son or daughter to be married, which gives information on the marital history of the parent/CEO. Because divorces in New York are not public, this search provides excellent coverage of CEOs' marital history and remarriage events for New York.
The final source of CEO marital history data was internet-based biographical sites and general web searches. Web pages such as nndb.com and answers.com provide biographical information on CEOs, which often includes divorces. In addition, google.com searches provide links to biographical websites that are specific to a CEO. Biographical information is frequently available from websites for a CEO's personal foundation or for the corporate web page of the company at which the CEO is affiliated.
The data are cross-checked across the various sources when available to ensure accuracy.
Due to the inability to match CEOs with divorce filings based on a unique identifier (e.g., Social
Security Number), I match CEOs to divorce events based on names and other personal information. I require matching on several variables to ensure the quality of matches, because several CEO names are common. To control for possible coincidence of names, I match on age, location, and any other personal information to appropriately link CEOs to their correct marital history. The commonality of a name could rule out any possible matching, especially when there were no unique identifiers, such as the identification of divorce for the CEO in the media or the name of the spouse. For example, any matches to John F. Smith of General Motors would not have been coded as an observable divorce in the sample, due to the near impossibility of confirmation of divorce without media sources indicating that it was, in fact, this particular John Smith getting a divorce on a particular date. On the other hand, marital information on Ignatius J. Panzica of Global Motorsport Group would be entered into the data with fewer necessary identifiers needed for confirmation of the marital information, due to the rarity of the name. In general, age, name of spouse, confirmable date of marriage/divorce, and geographical location were used in conjunction with name matching to ensure the collected data accurately represent the marital history of the appropriate person.
Geography may not match well between the CEOs' residence and divorce filings. CEOs do not have to live in the same geographic area as the principal location of his company. Even if a CEO lives near his company's headquarters, divorce jurisdiction is based upon "domicile", not "residence". Any place that the CEO or spouse own property at which they spend a substantial amount of time may be considered appropriate jurisdiction for divorce, depending on the law in the jurisdiction. A husband and wife may both file for divorce in separate states to attain law more favorable to one party. However, geography still retains value as a matching variable for a two reasons. First, as reported by Liu and Yermack (2007) , CEOs typically "live about as far from headquarters as other workers" at a median of 13.6 miles. Second, while the importance of jurisdictional issues cannot be marginalized, courts have tended to converge in their policies of equity on the distribution of property in a divorce proceeding.
This implies that the economic drivers for venue choice are not as significant as they were historically, leaving less incentive to "forum shop" by the parties to the divorce. Altogether, geographic proximity seems to still play a significant role in determining where the CEO will have a divorce filing. In addition, confirmation with the media sources supports the notion that divorce filings tend to be created in the state where the CEO and his company headquarters exist. 
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